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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/284,320	06/21/1999	SEISHI KATO	01997.004700	2154

7590 05/31/2002  
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EXAMINER

SEHARASEYON, JEGATHEESAN

ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
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1647

DATE MAILED: 05/31/2002

18

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

# Office Action Summary

Application No.

09/284,320

Applicant(s)

KATO ET AL.

Examiner

Jegatheesan Seharaseyon

Art Unit

1647

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

## Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133).
- Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

## Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 24 April 2002.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

## Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 6,8 and 12-18 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 6,8 and 12-18 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

## Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
- Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
- 11) ☐ The proposed drawing correction filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is: a) ☐ approved b) ☐ disapproved by the Examiner.
- If approved, corrected drawings are required in reply to this Office action.
- 12) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner.

## Priority under 35 U.S.C. §§ 119 and 120

- 13) ☒ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☒ All b) ☐ Some \* c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.
3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).
- \* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.
- 14) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for domestic priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) (to a provisional application).
- a) ☐ The translation of the foreign language provisional application has been received.
- 15) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for domestic priority under 35 U.S.C. §§ 120 and/or 121.

## Attachment(s)

- 1) ☐ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449) Paper No(s) \_\_\_\_\_.
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413) Paper No(s). \_\_\_\_\_.
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)
- 6) ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_.

**DETAILED ACTION**

1. The request filed on 4/24/02 for a Continued Prosecution Application (CPA) under 37 CFR 1.53(d) based on parent Application No. 09/284,320 is acceptable and a CPA has been established. An action on the CPA follows.
2. Applicant is requested to provide a Power of Attorney to indicate the transfer of the case.
3. Claims 6, 8 and 12-18 are pending.
4. The text of those sections of Title 35, U. S. Code not included in this action can be found in a prior Office action.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101, maintained***

5. Applicant's arguments filed on 4/24/02 in reference to claims 6, 8 and 12-18 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Thus, claims 6,8 and 12-18 are rejected under 35 USC 101 for lack of utility, for reasons set forth in Paper No: 19 and 22.

Applicant has traversed this rejection on the premise that a protein encoded by the claimed polynucleotide can be employed as a tissue marker (page 4 of the response) and the employment of that protein as a tissue marker is a credible, specific and substantial utility. The employment of a protein of the instant invention, or a nucleic acid encoding that protein, as a tissue specific marker is not a substantial or specific utility. All human proteins can invariably be classified into two categories, those that are expressed in a tissue or developmentally specific manner and those, which are expressed ubiquitously. It can be alleged that any protein which is expressed in a

Art Unit: 1647

tissue specific manner can be employed to detect the tissue in which it is expressed in a sample. Alternately, a human protein that is expressed ubiquitously can be employed to detect the presence of any human tissue in a sample. Such utilities are analogous to the assertion that a particular protein can be employed as a molecular weight marker, which is neither a specific or substantial utility.

One could just as readily argue that any purified compound having a known structure could be employed as an analytical standard in such processes as nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR), infrared spectroscopy (IR), and mass spectroscopy as well as in polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis (PAGE), high performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) and gas chromatography. None of these processes could be practiced without either calibration standards having known molecular structures or, at least, a range of molecular weight markers having known molecular weights. One could further extrapolate upon this premise by asserting that any item having a fixed measurable parameter can be employed to calibrate any machine or process, which measures that parameter. For example, any item having a constant mass within an acceptable range can be employed to calibrate a produce scale in a grocery store. The calibration of produce scales is certainly an important function since most states require produce scales to be calibrated and certified. Therefore, to accept Applicant's arguments that any nucleic acid encoding any protein of human origin is useful as a marker would be comparable to conceding that any object of fixed mass has *prima facie* utility as a weight standard, irrespective of any other properties possessed by that object. It was just such applications that the court appeared to be referring to when it

Art Unit: 1647

expressed the opinion that all chemical compounds are "useful" to the chemical arts when this term is given its broadest interpretation (*Brenner v. Manson*, 148 U.S.P.Q. 689 (Sus. Ct, 1966)). Because the steroid compound which was the subject of that decision had a known structure and molecular weight it could have readily been employed as a molecular standard at that time. Further, because that compound was a hydrocarbon it certainly could have been employed in the well known process of combustion for purposes of lighting and/ or the generation of heat. The generation of heat by combustion of hydrocarbons certainly was and remains an important process. Irrespective of such obvious utilities, the court still held that the compound produced by the process at issue in *Brenner v. Manson* did not have a specific and substantial utility.

To grant Applicant a patent encompassing an isolated polynucleotide encoding a naturally occurring human protein of as yet undetermined biological significance would be to grant Applicant a monopoly "the metes and bounds" of which "are not capable of precise delineation". That monopoly "may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area" and "confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development, without compensating benefit to the public" *Brenner v. Manson, ibid*). To grant Applicant a patent on the claimed polynucleotide based solely upon an assertion that the protein encoded thereby can be employed as a tissue marker is clearly prohibited by this judicial precedent since the compensation to the public is not commensurate with the monopoly granted and would be no different than granting a patent on the process disputed in *Brenner v. Manson* on the premise that the steroid produced thereby was useful as an analytical standard or as a fuel source.

Applicant further argues that the DNA of the instant invention can be used to identify genetic disorders. Although, the asserted utility is credible it is not specific or substantial. The specification does not disclose disorders associated with a mutated, deleted, or translocated gene of the instant invention. Further experimentation would be required of the skilled artisan to identify individuals with such disease. Therefore, the rejection is maintained.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112, first paragraph, maintained.***

6. Applicant's arguments filed on 4/24/02 in reference to claims 6, 8 and 12-18 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Thus, claims 6, 8 and 12-18 are rejected under 35 USC 112, first paragraph is maintained for reasons set forth in Paper No: 19, 22 and paragraph 5 above.

7. No claims are allowed.

**8. THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL.** Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.

Art Unit: 1647


### Contact Information

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Jegatheesan Seharaseyon whose telephone number is 703-305-1112. The examiner can normally be reached on M-F: 8:30-4:30.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Gary Kunz can be reached on 703-308-4623. The fax phone numbers for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned are 703-308-0294 for regular communications and 703-308-4227 for After Final communications.

Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application or proceeding should be directed to the receptionist whose telephone number is 703-308-0196.

JS  
May 29, 2002



JEFFREY STUCKER  
PRIMARY EXAMINER